CHANGING PATTERNS OF
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

KWAILT AS A CASE STUDY

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The analysis of the large-scale process of change taking place in Middle Eastern societies principally involves the transition from one social structure with a certain pattern of stratification to another. In order to promote a clear understanding of how the process of transition occurs, historical and empirical explorations of the development and functioning of the mechanisms of transition were carried out.

The structural mobility approach, as distinguished from career mobility, was utilized, which proved to be a remarkably useful instrument in the analysis of the mechanisms of transition in different historical periods. The elaboration of this approach
required that concepts commonly used in stratification research should be revised and modified.

The modifications of stratification concepts consisted in observing that the structural demand for manpower distribution would necessarily be reflected in the occupational structure; Considering that the occupational structure approximates the level of strata formation, which is an analytically distinct level from class structure. Thus the structural approach to social mobility reveals both: changes in the composition of social strata and/or shifts in the mechanisms of stratification. Bureaucratization is an associated process affected by structural mobility and directly related to the power dimension of stratification. These modifications constituted the major import of the present study.

The structural mobility approach to the comparative-historical study of the stratification systems of Arab societies made it possible to introduce a more stringent principle of periodization defined as structural discontinuities and/or shifts in the mechanisms of stratification. A radical departure from the Weberian Patrimonialism and the Marxian Asiatic Mode of Production approaches was thus accomplished.

This approach was then applied to the transformation of the society of Kuwait. Findings based on social mobility data derived from a representative sample of the population of Kuwait showed that even with enormous changes in the social structure, the magnitude of structural mobility can be restricted by group mobility and politically induced barriers through State intervention. The implications of these findings to other Arab and non-Arab societies could prove to be highly significant indeed.
FIRST DRAFT

DISSERTATION PROPOSAL

CHANGING PATTERNS OF STRATIFICATION IN
THE MIDDLE EAST:

KUWAIT (1950-1970) AS A CASE STUDY.

KHALDOUN AL-NAQEEB
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I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of underdevelopment has been generally recognized to be the product of the twentieth century. The conditions of underdevelopment are so general and diverse, permeating the major institutions of the society inflicted, that it can be approached from a number of different points, depending on the interests of the researcher. Our primary concern in the present study is with the problems and mechanisms of social change in the underdeveloped region of the Middle East. There are certain difficulties associated with the study of underdeveloped countries involving both theoretical and methodological issues; only those related to our topic will be mentioned in the course of the present paper. It seems quite justifiable, however, to single out the lack of clarity of the conceptual framework to be the chief source of these difficulties. The major part of the present paper will be devoted to the formulation of such an analytical scheme for the study of social change in the region.

From a sociological point of view, the state of underdevelopment is a set of historical conditions produced by the functioning of the particular social system, rather than attributable to a specific economic, political or cultural circumstance. Therefore, all attempts to explain underdevelopment as a purely economic or cultural, etc., phenomenon have proven to be exercises in futility (Hagen, 1962).
Accordingly, from this viewpoint, it is more meaningful to ask: what processes can be held responsible for the production of the conditions of underdevelopment?

In order to answer this question, we would want to know how the social system functions, i.e., the internal dynamics of the system. The knowledge of the internal dynamics of the social system constitutes only the first step. The second step should lead us to the analysis of the mechanisms by which processes in different spheres of socio-economic activities converge -- come to impinge on the basic organization of the society.

There is, obviously, nothing new in these ideas. The functionalists call these two steps: differentiation and integration (Eisenstadt, 1964). These two notions run through the evolutionary tradition in sociology. But the recognition of the necessary logical connection between processes and social structure has in the main resulted only in fragmentary descriptive schemes of social change, as we will later suggest. Despite the usefulness of such schemes, they have not advanced our knowledge of the internal dynamics of social systems (e.g., Posoien, 1962).

The intention of emphasizing the internal dynamics in the present context, however, is more specific than that which the functionalists usually have in mind. Our concern is not with the construction of "societal types," but rather with the analytical reconstruction of the basic organization of a particular society. From this point of view, the social stratification system constitutes an appropriate focus for the analysis of the processes of underdevelopment. There is no way in which a particular society is organized other than the system of stratification which clearly relates, directly or indirectly, to the major economic, social, political, and cultural institutions.
Tuden and Plontnicov (1970: 2) state quite explicitly that without knowledge of the system of social stratification, no understanding of the process of social change is possible. Given the assertion that a stratification system constitutes a fundamental aspect of the basic organization of society, social stratification must be understood in sufficiently broader terms than merely the unequal ranking, rewarding, and evaluating of individuals (Tumin, 1967). Otherwise the misunderstanding that, as Ponsioen (1962: 123) puts is, "there may be danger in identifying the whole process of change with one of these processes" such as stratification, demographic change, urbanization, industrialization, etc., may be unavoidable.

The difficulty with the above statement is that equal weight has been given to different processes of change. Whereas the process of stratification is being considered, in the present context, in terms of its centrality to the social structure from an analytical standpoint, and not as "a prime mover!" I will attempt to show that there is considerable evidence lending support to the proposed approach.

2. SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

The assertion that the internal dynamics inherent in the system of stratification are a valid indicator of the mechanisms, magnitude, and direction of social change, needs further qualification. In the conditions of underdevelopment there are, on the one hand, external forces that may influence the process of change in varying degrees, in different regions. These external forces emanate from the vestiges of the colonial order, or the degree of integration in the
international capitalist system, or from various other circumstances. Forces may also be characterized as external to the system of stratification, relating to administratively induced changes in planned or "semi-planned" societies. Although the impact of these forces may already be absorbed by the stratification system, they must be taken into consideration as independent factors for reasons that will become clear later on.

On the other hand, in most societies of the Middle East, there are other factors which have accounted for the stability of the traditional system of stratification that may, to varying degrees, counteract the reproduction of the new stratification pattern. Most students of the Middle East (Bill, 1972; Baer, 1966; Harris, 1958; Bujra, 1971; van Nieuwenhuijze, 1965) have noted such factors as tribal association, ethnic membership, religion, and kinship relations to have counter influences on the process of stratification. Again, one major task of the proposed study is to show that these factors have been sufficiently weakened to the extent that they cannot be regarded as separate cases of stratification.

To give a clear picture of how the problem might be conceived, tentative definitions of the two components of the problem, social change and social stratification, will be given. The intention here is to give sufficiently broad definitions to make the problem manageable.

In the context of the present study, the term "social change" will be used to mean: any modifications or alterations in the established sets of relationships that govern social phenomena, through time, relative to a dynamic social structure that constitutes these relationships. By modifications or alterations is meant the difference between initial and subsequent conditions, located by
the analysis.\footnote{Reference must be made here to Boulding (1953) and Moore (1960), although the latter offered a different definition later on (1965: 17).}

By "social stratification" we refer to: \textit{the process of the division of labor in society into occupations with differential income and power distributions, which provide the bases for group-formation}.\footnote{Bendix (in Bendix and Lipset, 1966: 73) gives a similar definition of stratification, but the emphasis is put on individual rank to provide basis for group-formation.} This definition of stratification needs to be further elaborated, but will be retained in its present form to avoid the over-burdening of conceptual connotations currently common in such definitions.

The important elements in the above definition of stratification are four in number: (i) the process of the division of labor is taken as the basis of social stratification. Caution will be taken to distinguish the use of the concept in the present context from the classical formulations of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. Certain evidence, however, deems it necessary to refer to the process of the division of labor as the basis of stratification. (a) It provides a linkage point with economic processes, such as the level of development of productive forces and market conditions, for the flow of manpower. Both of these aspects, neglected by American sociology until recently (Moore, 1966; Blau and Duncan, 1967). Furthermore, it indicates the mode and level of industrialization, urbanization, and economic growth (Gibbs and Martin, 1962). (b) It is susceptible to historical analysis, which makes it possible, for the above uses, to deduce and measure changes and variations in the stratification system, with clear-cut reference points. The historical aspect of the process of the division of labor is also important for conceptual
determination. For example, the reference to the manual, non-manual distinction is impossible -- from an analytical point to view -- without reference to the changes in the process of production, such as the degree of the division of labor in society (Moore, 1955; Parkin, 1971).

(ii) The process of the division of labor is indicated by the occupational structure in society, which serves as a readily available, objective method for its operationalization. In other words, if the degree of the division of labor is operationally defined as changes in the occupational structure, then propositions concerning the former can be tested (with the full conceptual and empirical implications) in the latter. The logical relation between the occupational structure and the process of the division of labor is ascertained by definition.

(iii) Through the process of the division of labor, occupational groupings simultaneously acquire income and power dimensions. Both of these facets serve, through the historical process, to establish "normative criteria" for ranking occupational groupings. The "upper and lower" distinction is meaningless without such normative criteria anchored onto occupations. The "status" of occupations or the distribution of privileges in society may not be proportional to occupations but governed by the same system of rules of distribution as income and power, although status may not be inferred directly from occupational arrangement (Heller, 1969).

(iv) The normative criteria which establish their own common acceptance in society are thought to provide the basis of group formation. Such group formation process must be traced to the process of the division of labor, in which groups form as consequences of occupational differentiation. It is the social groups and not the
occupational groupings that establish the pattern of social stratification. A number of writers, as well as the common practice—especially in underdeveloped countries—speak of "classes" while relying only on the normative criteria which classify occupational groupings (Baer, 1966: 204-238; Harris, 1958; Bezergan, 1973). The process of social group formation on the basis of occupations may lead, if assuming further dimensions, to social class formation (Parkin, 1971). In the present context, social groups of this type, referred to as social strata, are the units of analysis and not the occupational groupings as designated in common practice (Blau and Duncan, 1967: 24-27; Hatt, 1961: 239-258). This distinction is conceptually and empirically significant and will be elaborated later.

Final notes concerning mobility, education, and inequality should be given here. Although social mobility has a dissociative effect on the process of stratification (Lopreato and Hazelrigg, 1972), it simultaneously contributes to setting a certain pattern of stratification. These two aspects of social mobility must be taken into consideration in order to understand how the system of stratification is reproduced by normative suasive, as well as coercive, means. Education, i.e., the attainment of skills, facilitates upward and inter intragenerational mobility. In this function it also has a contradictory role in underdeveloped countries, similar to that of mobility, but for different reasons. Both concepts perform certain functions in the distributive process.

Finally, the definition of stratification as a structured social inequality should not be confused with the degree of inequality. As Thielbar and Feldman (1972: 3) put it, changes in society "may obscure class boundaries but leave unaltered the range of variation in inequality between the rich and the poor."
3. OBJECTIVES AND GENERAL PROPOSITIONS

The conditions of underdevelopment are taken as restrictions on the process of stratification in underdeveloped countries, into which definition enter the impact of external forces. The process of social stratification is taken as a valid indicator of the process of change at large. Our concern is focused not on the formal properties of the system of stratification, but also, especially, on the elucidation of the internal dynamics of the process of stratification, which is assumed to be leading to social class formation. The actual research process shall involve, basically, identifying the initial conditions from which we may deduce a causal explanation of changing patterns of social stratification in the Middle East.

Since the elements of the theory of stratification that will be advanced in the proposed study have not been independently verified in underdeveloped countries, we have no concrete grounds for the anticipation that the outcomes predicted will coincide with the actual outcomes. For these two reasons, we will be content with the most general of propositions, postponing the formulation of specific hypotheses for a later date. Following are four general propositions upon which our theory rests.

1. Given the sources of change at the initial point: As the degree of the process of the division of labor increases, the formation of social groups along stratified occupational lines with differential income and power distributions increases.

2. Given the counteracting forces: As the formation of stratified occupational groupings increases, the differential distributions of income and power increase; So that:
A. The greater the differential distributions, the greater the concentration of income and power in the property-owning strata.

B. The greater the differential distribution, the greater the increase in non-manual occupations.

C. The increase in the differential distributions may not be proportional to the increase in the productive base of society.

3. As the differential distributions of income and power increase, recruitment into stratified occupational groupings along educational attainment and kinship relations increase. So that:

A. The greater the degree of the division of labor, the less the recruitment along kinship lines.

B. Kinship relations determine, in part, the chances for upward mobility.

C. As the recruitment by educational attainment increases, while the productive base of the society lags, state intervention in the market mechanisms increases.

D. The greater the skills required for an occupation, the greater the scarcity of that occupation.

4. As the degree of the division of labor in society increases, state intervention in the economic and political systems increases. So that:

A. The greater the formation of social groups, the greater the control of the ruling strata of the state, and the greater the competition for larger shares in political power.

B. While the productive base in society lags, the greater the differential distributions of income and power, the
greater the reliance of the state on non-normative means of control (coersion).

The first two propositions are intended to predict outcomes relating to causes of change in the traditional pattern of stratification. The third proposition predicts outcomes involving the stabilizing processes of the "new" pattern of stratification. The last proposition is intended to predict outcomes relating to the instability of the stratification system.
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

1. ON THE DIVISION OF LABOUR

The concept of the social division of labor as the basis for social stratification is not new in sociology. Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, particularly, were aware of the wide implications of the division of labor for social behavior. It is precisely on this point that some of the basic differences between these three writers center. Their divergent explanations of the consequences and growth of the division of labor still occupy a central place in contemporary social theory (Giddens, 1971:244).

To Marx, the concept of the division of labor is crucial for the explanation of the rise of capitalism. On a more abstract level, Giddens (1971:228-229) maintains that two separate but directly related sources of alienation are rooted in the capitalist mode of production: (a) "the technological alienation", i.e., the labor-process, or what Lopreato and Hazelrigg (1972:14) call "alienation of production;" and (b) "market alienation", i.e., separation of producer from product. In Lopreato's and Hazelrigg's theory, "job satisfaction" or dissatisfaction determines the success of the end-product of the labor process.
Both types of alienation are integral to the expansion of the division of labor: the emergence of class societies in history is dependent upon the specialization of tasks made possible by the existence of surplus production (Giddens, ibid.)\textsuperscript{3} In the words of Marx (1964), "the division of labor is nothing but the alienated form of human activity."

In the Marxian analytical scheme, a certain level of the division of labor in the productive activity corresponds to the level of development of the productive forces (capacity and potential) of society. As a "technical division of labor develops, it gives rise to the relations of production proper. The relations of production are a generalized form of the division of labor." (Lange, 1963, Vol.I:15-20) The dependence of the relations of production on the forces of production, together with the type of ownership of the means of production results in the specific mode of production (Marx and Engels, Vol. I, The Preface:502-506).

Alongside the "purely technical" division of labor in the process of production, a social hierarchic division of labor develops and becomes generalized. These social relations and the social consciousness indispensable for the existence of the particular mode of production comprise the superstructure. The "mode of production," together with its superstructure, is called the "socio-economic formation" or the social system; whereas the relations of production proper are called its "economic base."\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{3}Lopreato and Hazelrigg(1972, ibid.) derived a number of empirically relevant propositions from the Marxian concept of alienation. For an examination of the Marxian concept of the division of labor using recent ethnographic data, see Mandel(1968, Vol.I:23-133).

\textsuperscript{4}The terms "economic base," "superstructure," "social formation," and "social consciousness" come from Marx(Marx and Engels, Preface, ibid).
In the process of the division of labor, social classes develop, and the whole institutional fabric of society is constituted. It is this intrinsic nature "of the connection between the division of labour and the class structure which makes it possible for Marx to proceed to the conclusion that the transcendence of alienation is possible through the abolition of capitalism." (Giddens, 1971:232-233)

But this is not the only aspect of the division of labor upon which the views of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim differ. The forms of social development of societies in general are subject to differing interpretations. For Marx, history is a dialectical process, evolving from the internal dynamics of social organization. The continual emergence of contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production is but only one manifestation of the dialectical process (Marx and Engels, ibid.). This "movement" in history is marked by the appearance and subsequent disintegration of several modes of production associated with certain levels of the development of the division of labor (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, Vol.I:21-80).

Undeniably, this aspect of the division of labor, as formulated by Marx, has a limited applicability to the present conditions of underdevelopment. And the alleged "Asiatic mode of production" in non-European countries has been subject to a considerable controversy (Habubaum in Marx, 1968; Leichtham, 1964; Rodinson, 1966; Furtado, 1971). A great deal of research still needs to be carried out in different regions of the contemporary world to bring about a fuller theoretical clarification of the conditions of underdevelopment.

Durkheim approaches the process of the division of labor from an entirely different angle. In the Social Division of Labor (1947), his main concern is not labor as such, but social activities in general (Steiner, 1972). For him, the social division of labor takes precedent and priority over the "economic" division of labor (Aron, 1970, Vol.I:14).
Social development is to be understood in the process of differentiation, what Spencer called the transformation of the "homogenous" into the "heterogenous." But Durkheim understood these historical states to be societal types and thus, to him, differentiation became the effective process.

So, the degree and scale of the process of differentiation of tasks serve as the objective criteria for the classification of societies from the simple to the complex. For Durkheim, the social division of labor is a mode of integration (solidarity) of the consequences of the natural evolutionary process of differentiation. For this reason, he believed that the simple and complex societal types represent certain concrete modes of organization such as: (simple) mechanical solidarity corresponding to a segmental structure; and (complex) organic solidarity corresponding to the differentiated, specialized structure (Giddens, 1971). Based upon this evolutionary scheme, Durkheim (1915) believed that all societies follow the evolutionary path from the simple to the complex.

Weber's treatment of the division of labor was purely in economic terms (1964:218-254). He clearly distinguished between the economic, social, and political dimensions of stratification corresponding to his class, status, and party (1958:180-195). Class belongs to the economic sphere and "unambiguously" represents economic interests. Status groups belong to the social sphere, as social groups participating in the distribution of "social honor" in the community. Weber maintains that not only classes are independent of status groups; but also, social honor, or prestige, which "may even be the basis of political or economic power." (ibid., p. 180). "Classes," "status groups," and "parties" are related to the distribution of power within a community (ibid., p. 181).
Parkin (1971:18) thinks that the Weberian approach has resulted in a refinement of the Marxian "model," given the fact that the discrepancies between different dimensions of stratification may not always apply to the modern world. But a fundamental component has been lacking in the Weberian approach---the absence of any theory of the distribution of social "honor." Indeed, the absence of any method by which discrepancies between the three dimensions of stratification might be reconciled in terms of a social structure has led to much misunderstanding and debate in contemporary sociology. There are other aspects of Weberian thought, with regard to the analysis of the factors promoting rationalization "on the level of meaning" in the sphere of religious belief, which have had considerable influence on contemporary thought.

2. SOME RECENT STUDIES

Our concern in the present paper is obviously not with the formal properties of stratification systems in industrialized Western societies. There are, however, a number of studies that have an important theoretical relevance to our topic. In all of these studies, the Marxian and the multi-dimensional (or what Parkin (1971:29) calls the neo-Weberian) approaches are in continuous confrontation. The point to be made here is that the Marxian approach provides a theory of the mechanisms of social change, which is decidedly lacking in Weber. Lopreato and Hazelrigg (1972:88-92) argue this point quite effectively.

As to the question of what are the bases of inequality, the multi-dimensional approach to social stratification, largely stemming from Weber, poses a fundamental problem. As pointed out by Pfautz (1953:391), "if there is some degree of consensus as to the definition of social stratification as a system of inequality, there is almost none on the question: Inequality, with respect to what?" It is this persistent problem which led Jackson and Curtis (1968) to demonstrate the difficulty
in measuring what is conceptually unclear (also: Hodge, 1968).

A great deal of research has been done to specify certain criteria for social inequality, such as occupation, income, education, prestige, power, et cetera. The compilation of Thielbar and Feldman (1972) certainly reflects the situation accurately. But the specification of these criteria did not result in the modification of the concept of stratification nor in an empirical theory. Perhaps, the most acute controversy in these studies concerns the confusion of social classes and social strata (Rodman, 1968). In the context of multi-dimensional approach, we are no longer interested in social classes or stratified class systems; but rather, in a generic meaning "status," where "status" is taken to mean a rank, or a relative position on any value hierarchy. Therefore, social class has come to refer merely to any type of stratum (e.g., Bogue, 1969).

Most of these studies have shown, however, that even without a clear conceptualization of social stratification, occupational classifications are the most reliable "measure" of social stratification (Jackson and Curtis, 1968; Hodge, 1971; Reiss, 1961; Blau and Duncan, 1967). As the reliability of occupational classifications is empirically tested, there appears to be an explicit tendency, particularly in social mobility studies, to consider these occupational groupings as social strata or social classes interchangeably--At times, without the necessary qualification as to their actual nature as occupational strata or classes (Schnore, 1961; Curtis, 1961; Strauss, 1971). In addition, there has been a serious ideological complication in mobility studies of major proportions, that must be dealt with, which Lenski (1966:22-23) characterized as the "radical-conservative controversy."

Finally, two of the recent studies have attempted a general theoretical formulation of the stratification system. The first was an
attempt to arrive at general propositions concerning stratification from a functionalist point of view (Davis and Moore, 1945). The second was a synthetic theory of Marx and Pareto of the problem of authority (Dabrendorf, 1968; 1972). Both of these theories have been sufficiently criticized (e.g., Tumin, 1953; Wrong, 1959; Lopreato and Hazelrigg, 1972; Bill, 1972).  

3. SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

So far, we have attempted to specify what the nature of stratification systems might be. Then, we tried to show why stratification systems develop. A superficial review of recent studies indicates the total lack of consensus on this issue. The third aspect that needs to be clarified here is the mutual influences between stratification systems and other structural variables with regard to social development. More precisely, we need to know two things. First, what are the factors that cause stratification systems to change, whether internal or external? Secondly, how do changes in stratification systems contribute, or co-determine the general social changes in society? Given the centrality of the process of stratification to the social structure.

Here again, we find considerable disagreement among social scientists. To begin with, the first quarter of this century witnessed an intense debate between three different schools of thought. The contrasting views of the three schools were centered around three principles or axioms: Cultural diffusion, evolution by stages, and cyclical paths of development (Sorokin, 1947; Moore, 1963). One interesting outcome of this debate, among many others, was the radical "culturalism" of Lesli White (1947) and his followers. But as contradictory data on

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5Comprehensive bibliographies of recent studies on Social Stratification in different countries are given by: Glenn(1970); Warner (1957); Pfauts (1953); Svalastoga (1964); and Jackson and Curtis (1968).
social development accumulated, the debate gradually lost its relevance to contemporary sociological theory.

Furthermore, the classical evolutionary views shared the same fate particularly in providing a poor fit to the recent data on social development. Einsenstadt (1964:373) contended that the two stumbling blocks that caused the classical evolutionary model to break down were two: "The first was the assumption that the development of human societies is unilinear, and the major stages of development are universal. The second . . . is the failure to specify fully the systematic characteristics of evolving societies or institutions, as well as, the mechanisms and processes of change through which the transition from one "stage" to another was effected." I would like to suggest that recent dichotomous theoretical formulations in Sociology and cultural Anthropology such as traditional-modern (Hagen, 1962), and folk-urban (Redfied, 1947; Miner, 1952), which find their intellectual origins in the classical evolutionary "model; remain basically confronted with similar stumbling blocks as mentioned by Einsenstadt.

The contemporary "structural-functionalists" introduced the concept of "equilibrium" into the evolutionary statement of change, which has produced, according to Moore (1960: 818), unrealistic "static" propositions. Of course, the concept of equilibrium need not produce state propositions (Lopreats, 1971: 313-327). But the disastrous consequences of such an approach were that, whenever an implicit equilibrium model was used, changes in the patterns of relationships were seen to be deriving from "external" sources, and thus, in an implicit sense, accidental (Buckley, 1958; Boskoff, 1957, 1971; Moore, 1955; Rhodes, 1968).
**TYPOLOGY**

A recent concise statement of the functionalist approach to social development has been provided by Snelser (1959), Eissenstadt (1964), and Parsons (1967). Societies are thought to be able to sustain continuous development toward differentiation, proceeding through various stages of specialization. Through the continuous regulation of these specialized units, an integrative process ensues, producing a "center" upon which the problems of different groups within the society increasingly impinge. Such a process paves the way for the emergence of political, religious . . . etc. centers distinct from the ascriptive components of the relatively "closed" kinship-based "primitive" community.

On both extremes of this process, there exists the polar opposites of development, traditional-modern, which are considered as ideal typical of their respective modes of organization. Hagen (1962:55) summarizes the typical characteristics of the traditional mode of organization as follows. (1) Ways of behavior continue with little change from generation to generation; (2) behavior is governed by custom; (3) the social structure is hierarchical (vis-a-vis specialized and differentiated!); (4) the individual's position in society is ascribed; (5) and finally, economic productivity is low. Modern societies should exhibit exactly the opposite characteristics.

Why do traditional societies break down? The functionalists emphasize three types of inherent strains in the social system: (a) demographic imbalances, universal scarcity situations, and the "dialectic" conflict between normative alternatives (Moore, 1960, 1966; Davis and Moore, 1945; Davis, 1958; Smelser, 1963; Appelbaum, 1970). By emphasizing inherent strains in the system, the functionalists are clearly attempting to move away from the interpretation of
an implicitly static to explicitly dynamic "equilibrium". But whether a shift in emphasis of theoretical perspectives is sufficient to produce analytical rather than descriptive schemes, remains to be seen.

The traditional-modern dichotomy has been increasingly coming under serious attack on two related levels, which has, in effect, posed the problems of development anew. First, recent data on underdeveloped countries have clearly shown that the adequacy of the dichotomous theory of development, conceptually as well as empirically, is indeed suspect (Eisenstadt, 1973, et al.). Secondly, an increasing number of scholars have argues quite persuasively, that it is erroneous to equate development with modernity (Bendix, 1967; Gusfield, 1967; Portes, 1972).

The concept of modernity, for our purposes, is a strange assortment of ideas, relating to different aspects of development. It has been used to imply (almost interchangeably with): industrialization, urbanization, westernization, secularization... etc. It has a decidedly ahistorical meaning when it is used descriptively. When advanced societies are posited by the theory as the ideal state, "modern" political elites and entrepreneurs are destined to play similar roles as they did in advanced capitalist societies, to bring about a happy state of affairs (Rhodes, 1968; Applebaum, 1970; Ponsioen, 1965; Thompson and Reischauer, 1966; Berque, 1965).

The diverse meanings of the concept of modernity, however, do point out to certain elements contained in traditional modes of behavior which impede social development. But underdevelopment is a complex phenomenon, certainly much more complex that that. Issawi (1966a: 19) summarizes some of the factors that impeded the industrialization of the Arab countries, and the other underdeveloped areas: (1) the narrowness of
the market, because of low agricultural productivity; (2) the unfavorable social structure; (3) the scarcity of iron and coal; (4) the dearness of fuel—until very recently⁶; (5) very poor transport systems; (6) the paucity of investment capital; (7) the absence of industrial credit; (8) lack of skilled manpower, still more, entrepreneurs; (9) all these "difficulties were greatly aggravated by the nature of the relationships between the Arab countries and the West."

Assuming for the moment that industrialization is an indication of development which is not entirely true (for reasons the discussion of which is clearly beyond the scope of this paper), social scientists emphasized different factors, from different theoretical perspectives, as posing barriers to industrial development. Nurkse (1953:5) for example, in his Cairo Lectures, envisioned the problem of capital formation to be the main barrier to growth. Whereas Kindleberger (1958) sought the explanation of Nurkse's supply-demand vicious circles in the increase in income differentials and the resultant "demonstrative effect". Schumpeter (1934) previously, had emphasized the role of the entrepreneurs (or absence of it) in development. Schumpeter's idea has been increasingly coupled with the "theory" of: absence of "protestant ethic" type of ideology as the cause of weakness of national entrepreneurs (Berque, 1965; Gecrtz, in Hagen, 1962). Elites theories, viewing elites as basically non-conformist leaders (including entrepreneurs) offer similar propositions as to their role. (Posoien, 1962; Ersinestadt, et al., 1973; Bill, 1973).

Baran (1968), Furtado (1971), and Hagen (1962) have forcefully pointed out the inadequacy of economic theories of growth, from different perspectives, but for similar reasons. The first two writers were ⁶Tanzer (1969) points out that oil resources necessary for industrialization is still a persistent problem for many underdeveloped countries.
concerned with the structural consequences and explanation of under-development. In their structural explanation the two items on Issawi's list: (a) the unfavorable social structure; (b) and the nature of the relations of Arab countries with the West, become more prominent. It is exactly here where the function of the stratification system in social change and development, is to be explained. Hagen's (1962: 36-62) objections relate to the absence of social psychological variables in the economic theories of growth (Rhodes (1968) reviews the inclusion of McClelland's (1968) achievement motive, and Portes (1972) Lerner's (1958) theory of MODernism).

In this respect, both the functionalist evolutionary perspective and the economic theories of growth share the tendency of misinterpretate the nature of underdevelopment. Furtado (1971: 142) was direct to the point: "... underdevelopment evolves not as an endogenous transformation of a pre-capitalist economy but from a process of grafting onto the latter one or more enterprises connected with the commercial activity of industrialized economies in a state of expansion. The misunderstanding of traditional economics in this respect is due to a failure to realize that development by external induction is different from the classic formation process of the European capitalist economics".

The end result is what Furtado (ibid.) calls a state of external disequilibrium, in which underdeveloped structures become a hybrid systems consisting of developed and backward sectors, each with a specific type of behavior. Mamlakis (1969) letter expounded greatly on the views of the structuralist school of Furtado, and attempted to develop a theory of "sectoral clashes", to supplement, as he put it (1969: 9-10), the theory of class struggle. His claim that the struggle between economic rector, rather than the struggle between income groups (classes), "is the moving force behind growth as well as
inflation" in Latin America, remains to the best of my knowledge, unsubstantiated.

I would like to draw attention to the implicit relation between Furtado's line of reasoning and the last item on Issawi's list. Both of these statements are related to the complex phenomenon of imperialism. Here again, social scientists of different theoretical orientations and intellectual persuasion subscribe to one version of imperialism or another (Kemp, 1967). Kenneth Boulding (Boulding and Mukerjee, 1972: ix-xviii) provides us with a schematic presentation of the elements of imperialism. I will condense these for the sake of brevity: (a) Imperialism is a relationship between groups; (b) the relationship implies inequality of "status"; (c) this inequality of "status" usually arises out of the exercise of superior "threat"; (d) threat must be legitimated and regularized and hence must be made part of a political system; (e) imperialism is related to the degree of legitimation (and not legality) of the dominance relationship (p.x).

Although Boulding's presentation suffer from minor weaknesses, it does give a general picture of the phenomenon of imperialism, which has amounted to an international division of labor. Other scholars (Matus, 1963; Moore, 1966; Horowitz, 1967) have provided a fuller, well rounded picture of the complexity of imperialist network of relationships, and not merely as legitimized threat. The important point, which is of significance for our purposes, is the distinction between "classical" or historical imperialisms and contemporary imperialism in the concrete historical context, contemporary imperialism evolved out of colonialism due to the forces of monopoly capital.

Frank (1967, 1968, 1969) and Gonzales (1965) have recognized the possibility that an imperialist-type relationship may develop within one country. Frank described as the "metropole-satellite" relationship (1968), while Gonzales was much more concerned with the phenomenon of "internal colonialism."
(Sweezy, 1956; Mandel, 1968; Vol. 2)\textsuperscript{8}.

As we are speaking in a strictly historical context, we are concerned primarily not with an imperialist relationship between two countries (though we may well do), but rather with an international network of these relationships, which serves as a coercive device as well as an inhibitive factor of development, i.e., the international capitalist trade market. There is, at any rate, enough evidence to document the functioning of this coercive device (Magdoff, 1969, 1970; Jalee, 1968, 1969; Hayter, 1971; Jones, 1972; Fann and Hodge, 1971; Rhodes, 1970; Beauchamp, 1934). The cumulative effects of the international network of the relations of imperialism on the underdeveloped countries we shall refer to hereafter as the "external forces", of change\textsuperscript{9}.

The distinction between historical and contemporary imperialisms rests upon two important premises: One, the development of underdeveloped countries is being continually co-determined by external forces beyond their control, i.e., the hypothesis of arrested development. It is here where the observation that the weakness of the entrepreneurs resulted in the lack of industrialization, become significant (Issawi, 1966a: 20-22, 1966b; Frank, 1972, Arrighi and Saul, 1973: 105-143). Two, the underdeveloped countries have been integrated to varying degree in the international trade market. The process of integration assumes the forms of expansion of the capitalist mode of production (Frank, 1968; Petras, 1970: 13-53). Both of these premises are subject to a considerable disagreement and debate.

\textsuperscript{8}Schumpeter (1968) for example emphasized the political aspect of imperialism without such a distinction: imperialism is brought about by the aggressive action of states. More recently Cohen (1973), adopted similar approach.

\textsuperscript{9}This is not similar to Bottomore's exogenous change, particularly since the intention is not to posit a classification of the origins of change, but to infer the effects of external forces as they are mediated by the internal dynamic (see Bottomore, 1971:308).
Finally, there are numerous studies on the Middle East and other regions of comparable socio-economic conditions, which have approached the functions of social stratification in social development from different angles, that must be mentioned. Unfortunately, due to the limitation of space, one cannot evaluate the particular contributions of each or some of these studies to our general understanding of the phenomenon under discussion. Below, one will only enumerate a few. Some of the items listed refer to compilation of essays--specific references to single essays were not made.

In the historical field the contributions of the following are most notable: Lutsky (1969); Laqueur (1958); Levy (1957); Goitein (1957, 1966); Grunebaum (1961). Anthropological and Ethnographic materials are published in Salim (1969); Shiloh (1969); Antoun (1972 a, 1972 b); Sweet (1970); Harris (et.al. 1958); Tuden and Plontnicov (1970); Bujra (1971); Plotnicov and Tuden (1970). Other economic and political studies that bear directly on our topic are: Baer (1966); Alexander (1972); Meyer (1959); Finnie (1958); Rustow (1960); Fisher (1955); Halpern (1963); Bill (1972); Grundy (1964). An outstanding sociological study which was published a quarter of a century ago by Bonne (1948) still has an immense value for sociological research in the area. Other sociological studies, those of Berger (1964) and Lerner (1958) are widely known in the West. The studies of Warriner (1948, 1957) on Land and Poverty in the Middle East, and O'Connor (1962); Shwardran (1955) on the impact of oil are also widely known. Other studies attempted application of Marxist categories: Emmanuel (1970); Halliday (1969, 1970); Abdul Malek (1968); Hussein (1969); Rodinson (1966); and el-Kodsy (1970).

Studies dealing specifically with Kuwait are listed in the bibliography. Some important historical studies on Kuwait—those published in Arabic are not reported.
III. METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGIES

1. A PROPOSED SCHEME OF ANALYSIS

So far, we have been guided by the line of reasoning which we stated in the first part of this paper. This line of reasoning consists of the following logical steps: (a) All phenomena of social change either refer or are mediated by social relationships (by definition). (b) All social relationships, and hence changes within them, cannot be analyzed and evaluated without reference to the dynamic social structure that constitutes them (by definition). (c) A system of social stratification is one of the fundamental ways in which social relationships are organized. (d) Changes in the stratification system are a valid indicator for the process of change in society, in two important ways: as causes and as consequences (mutual causation).

The diverse implications of this line of reasoning, as they are reflected in a brief review of the literature, makes our study rather too ambitious, and even too pretentious. The actual research process as I envision it at present, is much more modest and much more realistic. The same thing applies to the two main objectives set for this study: (1) To identify initial conditions from which we may deduce a causal explanation for changing patterns of social stratification in the Middle East (a macro-analysis). (2) To attempt an analytical elucidation of the process of social stratification in one Arab Country (Kuwait) with specific comparative implications.

As we reach this point, the relation between the two concepts of "Stratum" and "class", which have been the center of debate in Western sociology, must be tentatively clarified. One readily available alternative is suggested by Dahrendorf (1968: Chap. I). According to this approach, social stratum is used as a descriptive concept, while
social class is considered as an analytical concept. This approach is not useful for our purposes, in that it does not point out possible theoretical and practical relations between the two concepts. If the process of the division of labor in society is taken as a common denominator for both phenomena, then such theoretical as well as practical relations between these two concepts are, indeed, a realistic anticipation.

As I understand it, "social class" refers to a particular historically conditioned set of relations that social strata have with each other, in the process of the division of labor, corresponding to a particular mode of production. These relations are constituted in such a way as to serve as objective criteria for differentiating social strata along differential distribution of rewards and privileges. Furthermore, the relations in question cut across the total institutional arrangements in society, to the extent that they acquire legal, political, ideological, and social-psychological properties. Hence, the objective criteria of differentiation becomes masked or transformed into normative criteria. The normative criteria of differentiation, together with power generated by social relationships which find their expression in authority systems, are utilized by a ruling class to maintain this system of relationships.

When a group of people is referred to as a social class, it means that we are, in effect, willing to identify this group of people with that relationship that they have with other groups, which served to differentiate them in the first place, e.g., peasants and landlords. In this sense, social class is neither self-constitutive (in terms of boundaries), nor self-perpetuating (in terms of membership). The identification of social groups as belonging to social classes assumes consciousness of the class position on the part of the members of the group, which is an extremely complex phenomena. Social mobility has
been recognized as a process which impedes identification with social class. It is also a process which continually creates or reproduces the pattern of class relations, despite the variations it introduces in that pattern. I will leave matters to rest at that.

A class analysis of Arab societies is clearly beyond our means. But given the interaction between the historically conditioned mode of production and socio-economic formations, we can only assume that the process of stratification produces social classes in the conventional sense. As our interests is focused on the process of stratification, we will continue to point out possible inferences to the class structure, without having to be committed to specify the formal properties of that class structure. Provided that these possible inferences are not a priori identified with those of Marx. 10

Turning now to our subject matter, the first step in our research will have to do with an attempt to reconstruct the process of stratification. So that a specific stratification pattern can be recognized and analyzed. As hypothesized, the degree of the division of labor is held responsible for group formation along occupational lines. Therefore, we will have to analyze the occupational structure in, at least, three respects: (1) The flow of manpower with specific attention to structural relocation or dislocation (Moore, 1966:200-204). (2) Distribution of manpower according to the nature of work. i.e., manual/non-manual classification. (3) The market conditions for the distribution of skills, i.e., specialization (Moore, 1966; Blau and Duncan, 1967).

10 Professor Baer (1966:204) noting the lack of data on Arab societies recommends a practical approach of analyzing the special characteristics of economic and occupational groups within each of the main classes--upper, middle, and lower. Professor Halpern (1970:41-112) adopted a similar approach. Ponsioen (1969:200) on the other hand put the stringent requirement that class contradictions identified in reality should not be identified a priori to be always basically economic and have to express themselves classwise. Another objection has to do with the inapplicability of western concepts to pre-industrial societies (the "dualism" thesis posed by Hosklig 1966:177-193) and the unstratified societies (Smith, 1966: 141-176) will not be answered at present.
These three aspects of the occupational structure represent three different levels of the process of the division of labor in society. Stratification along occupational lines incorporates all these three levels. The first level refers to the availability of personnel for various occupations. It also refers, particularly, to the different sectors of the economy. Structural relocation is the condition where there is a marked movement from, say, agriculture to industry. Structural dislocation refers to the condition where a large segment of the population, for example, engaged in traditional trade becomes uprooted due to the obsolescence of their skills.

The second level of the division of labor is more important for our topic. The manual/non-manual labor is directly related to the relative position to the means of production with clear-cut income and power distributions. It is also sanctioned by cultural values in most Arab societies. The third and last level refers to the fluctuations in the demand on skills necessary for various occupations. These fluctuations reflect the method of recruitment into occupations; such as education in modern times. It is important to note that such classifications as manual/non-manual, and skilled-unskilled have different meanings in traditional societies.

What should emerge from this analysis of the occupational structure is some rudimentary form of ordering social groups according to their occupations. As we have hypothesized, we should discover that this ordering entails a number of things—the differential distributions of income and power are the most significant for our purposes. But it cannot be overemphasized that stratification along occupational lines does not simply involve the kind of work an individual does, but rather the social consequences of that for a group of people. The majority of students of the Middle East continually emphasize a number of factors
that meditate the social consequences of occupational stratification, particularly three: kinship relations, religious participation, informal associations (e.g., Van Nieuwenfzuijze, 1965).

Although there is some weight to the point thus raised, in that the above mentioned factors do produce variations in the pattern of stratification—sometimes these variations are considerable and should be taken into account, particularly, those due to kinship relations, we have no reason to believe, or at least, it has not been demonstrated that these meditating factors constitute in themselves independent basis for social stratification.

On the contrary, variations within every pattern of social stratification in the socio-cultural environment must and do arise—as they are fully expected in our study. But these variations must not constitute violations to the assumption of patterned or structured social relationships. Most scholars, who are certainly justified in pointing out the importance of these variations in the Middle Eastern pattern of stratification, pay little attention to the concept of social structure which plays a crucial role in the ordering and explanation of social relationships as they emerge from the process of the social division of labor, in the context of social stratification. If the concept of social structure is de-emphasized, then, certainly, alternative explanations of social stratification are needed to account for these variations.

In traditional times, there were more grounds to the objections raised by these scholars. There were historical, environmental, tribal, religious and other reasons that played, together with the stratification based on the division of labor, important functions in conditioning the general pattern of stratification to their respective influences. The determination of the nature of these influences on the pattern of stratification is now subject of historical research (Rodinson, 1966).
In the context of the present study, however, one of our major hypotheses is that, there is a tendency of the stratification pattern to be less effected by kinship relations. We will not only recognize the influence of kinship relations, but we will also attempt to explain it in the context of the process of stratification—as an enforcing factor as well. Our second and third propositions reflect the above discussion.

Our concern with the differential distributions of income and power is designed for the purposes of a macro-analysis. That is to say, the differential distribution of income, in the first instance, refers to the relative shares social strata receive in the distribution of national income or total output. Individual incomes are useful in determining the range of variation within groups—a purely descriptive value, such incomes are inconclusive evidence in themselves. In other words, if the income of a person is disproportional to his occupation or to the power he exercises in his social relationships, this is expected not to effect the general pattern for the social group to which he belongs. There may be other reasons, in each particular case, which causes this disproportionality—a micro-analysis. Until such disproportionality becomes a general pattern, it should not be considered as a cause of alarm. How large a range of variations can be tolerated without effecting the pattern of stratification will depend on the empirical estimation of the relative shares from the available data.

Differential power distribution refers to social power generated in the social realtionship in context of stratification. Social power inferred from social relationships find its expression in the authority system. The differential distribution of power, therefore, involves the relative share social strata have in the authority system, particularly in the state system, which is defined as an institutional complex and not merely as the government (Miliband, 1969; Bonné, 1948). Political
representation of group interests and participation in decision-making bodies are other expressions of social power and competition for power (Rustow, 1971: 391-454).

In order to test our propositions, given elsewhere, we need to have five measures: (1) Measurement of the degree of the division of labor. (2) Measurement of group formation along occupational lines. (3) Measurement of income and power. (4) Measurement of social mobility. (5) Measurement of government participation.

The problem of obtaining these measures will ultimately depend on the availability and quality of empirical data. Few remarks in this respect will be given below.

2. METHOD OF DATA GENERATION

There are three types of data needed for obtaining the five measurements of our variables:

(A) Historical Data. This type of data is required for measuring social change in the occupational structure. Such data are very scarce. The general census in most Arab countries was not taken until the late 1940's. The first census in Kuwait was not taken until 1957. All Arab countries did not have adequate research facilities until very recently. Of all whatever scanty historical data we have, income data were never made public (Baer, 1966: 204). As far as Kuwait is concerned, however, some, admittedly, impressionistic information as well as some published material can be used to illustrate some of the drastic aspects of social change in this community. At certain points the findings of historical research must be used to fill the gaps in our present knowledge of the Middle East, whenever possible.
(B) Census data. Information on labor force participation is essential for our study. The most recent census gives such data with relatively tolerable margin of error (although the margin of error of coverage is rather high). In the 1970 census, in Kuwait, there is a somewhat detailed listing of occupations by industry and economic activity.\footnote{Gibbs and Martin (1962: 670) used similar classification of industry composition of labor force as the one used in Kuwait to measure the degree of the division of labor.} I anticipate that it is possible to derive preliminary estimates of our first two measures from the census date. The reliability of these estimates will be checked against a second estimate derived from the sample study. There are two sets of related data that are crucial for our study:

(i) Income data: this type of data is not reported in a uniform manner, particularly national income. There are some rough estimates of income distribution in diverse sources (e.g., International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1965). I must not fail to observe that as government employment increases, income distribution tends to become more standardized.

(ii) Political data: data pertaining to the socio-economic background of members of elected bodies as well as high office holders, is partially available. Major gaps, in our knowledge in this field do, for political reasons, exist.

(C) Sample survey. A stratified cluster sample of 1200 families, designed by the Central Statistic Office of Kuwait,\footnote{(Government of Kuwait, 1973). The Stanford Research Institute utilized this sample to assess the impact of the government compensation program. Preliminary findings of the study were published recently.} will be, hopefully, used to generate data on social mobility.
Information on the effects of education and kinship will be particularly relevant. A survey questionnaire will be constructed for generating data on mobility—-intra and intergenerational.

Finally, I would like to mention that the proposed study will be fully sponsored financially by Kuwait University.

3. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

To begin with, the proposed study is preliminary exploratory study. It is designed to investigate a very complex phenomenon in an underdeveloped country, where there is a general lack of reliable data, and where the prevalent political conditions are rather unfavorable to empirical research. Faced with this situation, there are two unacceptable alternatives: either continue the tradition of impressionistic study, or select a topic that will permit only "the most rigorous norms of scientific work"—the so-called "methodological inhibition". Germani (1968: 383) recognizing the problem of research in underdeveloped countries, warned against both extremes. I will be guided by the assumption that methodological strategies can be adapted to tolerate shortcomings in data on a theoretically significant problem, until the time reliable data are made available. Rather than continue an unproductive tradition. This should apply to both qualitative and quantitative data.

Secondly, as Blau and Duncan (1967:4) stated, a single empirical study of social stratification and mobility in one country cannot advance stratification theory, as it is not the objective of this study. Such a study can, however, improve our sociological understanding of social processes in a previously unstudied country. But in order to derive empirically relevant theoretical generalizations about social stratification, historical and comparative data are needed. Moreover,
from the point of view of the theory adopted here, analysis of class structure calls for other data concerning institutional conditions and the level of class contradictions, which cannot be collected, in a satisfactory manner, in the context of the present study. Therefore, as we stated earlier, direct inferences to the class structure will be mentioned whenever possible, but will not be pursued.

The major limitation our study has, it shares in common with most exploratory studies in sociology, and can be stated in the form of two questions. Is the conceptualization of our problem clear and unambiguous enough to permit accurate or relatively accurate measurement? The major part of the present paper was written in anticipation of this question. Furthermore, do our measurements of classificatory and quantitative variables, measure adequately and reliably what they purport to measure. One possible answer to the latter question would consist in the utilization of a method which is capable of ascertaining the nature and direction of relationships between variables, such as the multiple-classification (analysis of variance) elaborated by Blau and Duncan (1967: 128-140). But whether the assumptions of such a method will be met cannot be stated in advance--depending on the quality and reliability of data.

A comparative study of Arab societies involves two additional problems. Is it sufficient to define a community, as an independent case for research, in terms of its territorial or ecological independence? (Reiss, 1959:118). The fact that Arab society was dismembered due to an arbitrary colonial policy around 1914 (i.e., countries of the Arab East), poses another problem. Can we consider the political independence of Arab countries due the dismemberment policies, independent cases for comparative purposes? Does political independence constitute discontinuity in social and cultural traditions and institu-
tions? The latter problem, referred to in cross-cultural studies as the "Galton problem" (Naroll, 1968: 258) is a serious weakness of comparative studies of related countries.

Tentative solutions to these two problems are available, but with limited applicability to Arab countries. In the first instance a list of a community's or a cultural unit's attributes are used to distinguish it from other societal units. Reiss (ibid.) emphasizes the ecological and territorial attributes such as residence, territorial space, functions to meet common needs . . . etc., whereas NOral (op. cit., p. 248) singles out three cultural traits: common language, same state, same contact group.

In the second case, instead of maintaining the assumption of independence of cases, we focus on the effects of functional association. The problem then becomes a matter of controlling a correlation between factors considered related functionally to see whether this relationship is an artifact of common historical circumstances. This approach is more feasible for our purposes, but it is not without certain difficulties. Further research is required to develop a satisfactory method of comparing Arab countries with each other.

Apart from these limitations, there is of course, the overwhelming problem of lack of reliable data, which has played a certain part in the choice of our variables.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

I have tried in the preceding sections of this paper to enumerate and briefly discuss some of what I considered the essential elements of theory and methods relevant to the selected topic of the proposed study. Below is the skeleton outline of the research process.

I. Statement of the Problem
II. Historical Background:
   Kuwait and the Arab East
III. Theory and Methods
IV. Analysis of Data
V. Discussion and Findings:
   Toward a Comparative Perspective
VI. Conclusions
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